Domain generation algorithms (DGA) in stealthy malware
(Publication) Google search: [1]
| Domain generation algorithms (DGA) in stealthy malware | |
|---|---|
| Botnet | Conficker |
| Malware | |
| Botnet/malware group | |
| Exploit kits | |
| Services | |
| Feature | |
| Distribution vector | |
| Target | |
| Origin | |
| Campaign | |
| Operation/Working group | Conficker working group |
| Vulnerability | |
| CCProtocol | |
| Date | 2012 / 2012-03-05 |
| Editor/Conference | Damballa |
| Link | http://blog.damballa.com/?p=1504 blog.damballa.com (blog.damballa.com Archive copy) |
| Author | Gunter Ollmann |
| Type | |
Abstract
“ Do you remember all the fuss about Conficker many moons ago and its odd method of locating C&C servers? Instead of relying upon a static list of preconfigured domain names that corresponded to the location of the badguys C&C servers, it used an algorithm to calculate candidate domain names – and then tried reaching out to a handful of the candidates in a vein attempt to locate an active C&C server.
The authors behind the Conficker variants experimented with a number of algorithms but, at the end of the day, they failed to construct a cohesive botnet. Despite that “minor flaw”, Conficker infected devices still account for a sizable fraction of known malware infections around the work – years after the threat was studied to death and detection/protection/cleanup solutions are available everywhere.
Bibtex
@misc{Ollmann2012BFR912,
editor = {Damballa},
author = {Gunter Ollmann},
title = {Domain generation algorithms (DGA) in stealthy malware},
date = {05},
month = Mar,
year = {2012},
howpublished = {\url{http://blog.damballa.com/?p=1504 blog.damballa.com}},
}