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- 350 bytes (41 words) - 16:07, 28 July 2015
- 368 bytes (39 words) - 19:07, 7 February 2015
- |Image=Detection and Classification of Different Botnet C&C Channels.png ...[botnet]] [[C&C]] traffic is inherently different from legitimate network traffic. The best performance of our detection system has an overall accuracy of 0.1 KB (207 words) - 21:49, 30 July 2015
- ...device as a zombie device that connects to specific command and control (C&C) servers. What is also noteworthy about this file is that it hides its rout627 bytes (85 words) - 22:13, 5 August 2015
- ...I checked the script – everything looked ok. So the massive drop of ZeuS C&C server is fact. I noticed that six of the worst ZeuS hosting ISP suddently536 bytes (93 words) - 00:50, 22 August 2015
- 516 bytes (67 words) - 19:02, 7 February 2015
- 997 bytes (139 words) - 16:30, 3 August 2015
- 865 bytes (117 words) - 12:57, 31 July 2015
- |Link=http://www.xylibox.com/2012/09/weelsof-use-ssl-c.html www.xylibox.com374 bytes (41 words) - 16:28, 7 February 2015
- 40 bytes (3 words) - 03:27, 8 August 2015
- 39 bytes (3 words) - 11:29, 23 March 2016
- 211 bytes (25 words) - 22:56, 5 August 2015
- 1 KB (127 words) - 22:30, 31 July 2015
- 24 bytes (2 words) - 12:00, 30 October 2016
- 24 bytes (2 words) - 12:00, 31 July 2015
Page text matches
- ...ution, regarding C&C traffic obfuscation. The botnet owners placed their C&C server, which uses the common IRC protocol, as a hidden service inside of t532 bytes (75 words) - 19:18, 3 August 2015
- ...d taken offline, a single C&C in Russia (proobizz.cc) has remained. This C&C, and the bots communicating with it, are carrying out the last command issu592 bytes (81 words) - 00:42, 31 July 2015
- |Description=Logging information is sent to the C&C93 bytes (12 words) - 13:48, 8 August 2015
- |Description=Webmail used as a C&C medium89 bytes (12 words) - 15:50, 3 August 2015
- |Feature=Encrypt files, Encrypt without C&C connection,158 bytes (21 words) - 11:39, 23 March 2016
- |Introduction=* Seen using Yahoo webmail as C&C137 bytes (19 words) - 15:16, 18 July 2015
- ...f old C&C channels, decides to pick up Facebook as a coordinator for the C&C server. I use the word “coordinator” because the Trojan only receives s812 bytes (121 words) - 11:13, 3 August 2015
- ...er in India, located at an ISP called Webwerks. Since then, another Duqu C&C server has been discovered which was hosted on a server at Combell Group Nv ...rvers were used as part of the infrastructure, some of them used as main C&C proxies while others were used by the attackers to jump around the world an1 KB (211 words) - 04:57, 19 August 2015
- |Author=Christian J. Dietrich, Christian Rossow, Felix C. Freiling, Herbert Bos, Maarten van Steen, Norbert Pohlmann, ...ion, we correctly detected DNS C&C in mixed office workstation network traffic.1,003 bytes (130 words) - 14:14, 31 July 2015
- ...duction=Lié à [[sibling::Leouncia]] (enregistrement du nom de domaine du C&C)260 bytes (28 words) - 15:44, 8 August 2015
- |Image=Detection and Classification of Different Botnet C&C Channels.png ...[botnet]] [[C&C]] traffic is inherently different from legitimate network traffic. The best performance of our detection system has an overall accuracy of 0.1 KB (207 words) - 21:49, 30 July 2015
- ...I checked the script – everything looked ok. So the massive drop of ZeuS C&C server is fact. I noticed that six of the worst ZeuS hosting ISP suddently536 bytes (93 words) - 00:50, 22 August 2015
- ...groups is relatively common, but this is the first instance of newsgroup C&C usage that Symantec has detected.931 bytes (139 words) - 14:42, 3 August 2015
- ...command-and-control (C&C) channel. In this article we explore the Mocbot C&C in order to gain a better understanding of the reason for Mocbot's existenc The C&C servers, bniu.househot.com and ypgw.wallloan.com have been published in mos949 bytes (149 words) - 12:46, 31 July 2015
- ...Banking credential theft, Man in the browser, Backconnect server, Custom C&C encryption algorithm, Domain generation algorithm,315 bytes (40 words) - 05:29, 12 August 2015
- ...ct=This post is about the first network communication of Crisis with the C&C server. The reason why I think it’s very useful to write about it is that ...he C&C server is an authentication request. In the the sample I have the C&C server was located at the IP address 176.58.100.37. The communication is vi1 KB (168 words) - 21:31, 5 August 2015
- ...he main server controlled by the attackers, this server is not a typical C&C in its functionalities, but is mainly a collector of information from the d1 KB (193 words) - 05:28, 12 August 2015
- botnet detection approaches work only on specific botnet command and control (C&C) protocols (e.g.,2 KB (262 words) - 22:28, 5 August 2015
- ...out to a handful of the candidates in a vein attempt to locate an active C&C server.1 KB (174 words) - 05:24, 12 August 2015
- ...ands embedded in HTML pages and image files. W32.Morto has added another C&C communication vector by supplying remote commands through Domain Name Syste882 bytes (136 words) - 21:37, 30 July 2015