Alina: casting a shadow on POS
(Publication) Google search: [1]
| Alina: casting a shadow on POS | |
|---|---|
| Botnet | Alina, VSkimmer, BlackPOS |
| Malware | |
| Botnet/malware group | |
| Exploit kits | |
| Services | |
| Feature | |
| Distribution vector | |
| Target | |
| Origin | |
| Campaign | |
| Operation/Working group | |
| Vulnerability | |
| CCProtocol | |
| Date | 2013 / 2013-05-08 |
| Editor/Conference | Trustwave |
| Link | https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Alina--Casting-a-Shadow-on-POS/ (Archive copy) |
| Author | Josh Grunzweig |
| Type | Blogpost |
Abstract
“ Over the pastfew months, a number of malware families targeting Point of Sale (POS) systems have been discussed. First there was Dexter (Seculert / SpiderLabs), then there was its big brother vSkimmer, and more recently there was Dump Memory Grabber / BlackPOS. One of the most interesting threads of commonality between these samples is the command and control (C&C) structure used between them. Utilizing a C&C communication channel for data exfiltration, while previously rare, has become more and more common in POS malware. I'd like to use this blog post to discuss another similar sample that I recently got the chance to look at, named Alina. We've seen Alina on a number of active forensic cases in the past few months, which is how I was originally made aware of this malware family.
Bibtex
@misc{Grunzweig2013BFR1607,
editor = {Trustwave},
author = {Josh Grunzweig},
title = {Alina: casting a shadow on POS},
date = {08},
month = May,
year = {2013},
howpublished = {\url{https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Alina--Casting-a-Shadow-on-POS/}},
}